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CHAPTER I
Abstract
On January 6th, 2021, the nation watched from their television screens as a group of
extremists stormed the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C. An interesting emotion fell
over the U.S. public – it was both shocking and not shocking at all. The attack on the Capitol was
a by-product of years of internal division, catapulted by Trump’s presidency. Between racial
divisions and the progression of Black Lives Matter, the advancement of COVID and its
governmental policies, and Trump’s divisive nature of president at a peak, it seemed almost
inevitable that an offense like this would occur.
As political conversations surrounding this event became headline news on every media
source imaginable, I began wondering about extremism in general. What drives some people to
extremism but not others? Is there a predictable environment that creates extreme ideals? What
kinds of demographics are seen engaging in what kinds of extremism? How powerful of a force
was media in bringing this group together? These were the initial questions that inspired the
themes in this paper.
This paper begins with a literature review examining research on U.S. extremism and
media. Next, a methodology further explains the procedural elements of this paper. Then, the
four-fold hypothesis analysis begins that seeks to encompass questions about U.S. extremism and
its intersection with modern media. The first hypothesis posits a general question about party
identification and extremism. The second examines a more direct question about extremism and
media usage. The third asks about political news vs. commentary, and the fourth explores
differences in extremity between traditional and alternative media. The paper finishes with a
conclusion that entails general discussion and considerations for future research.
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Literature Review
A Brief Definition, History, and Inspiring Factors of U.S. Extremism
The United States is currently enduring one of the most divided times in history. The last
decade, and notably the Trump presidency, has followed with an abundance of political unrest.
Through it all, one emerging group that continues to gain traction is the far-right cohort of
American political extremists. This “fringe group(s),” while in existence for decades, has
become more mainstream in recent years, and is even publicly supported and advanced by
various American political leaders (Steck & McDermott, 2020). Conditions for extremism have
changed throughout U.S. history, but the modern environment lends a unique culture for it to
flourish under “normal” conditions. America has turned a cynical leaf, a development that has
come with the rise of such groups through deliberate partisanship, purposeful spreading of
misinformation, the redefinition of the American political system, and more. As seen in the wake
of Trump’s 2020 bid for a second term and the January 6th insurrection, the far-right is an
amassed group, growing more brazen in their actions. Extremism has always been inspired by
politics, but it is clear that modern extremism takes on a new kind of meaning with the American
public being influenced in new ways, particularly through the consumption and usage of presentday media (Mann & Ornstein, 2012).
Of most importance in understanding this subject lies in defining what extremism
actually is. Doing so is a challenge of course, since what makes something “extreme” is largely a
subjective concept that is not always transferrable between contexts and cultures. As far as U.S.
politics is concerned, some viewpoints purport that strict definitional distinctions should be set,
for example making clear the difference between radicalism and extremism, and claim that the
former represents more of a political doctrine and less of a violent ideology than the latter
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(Botticher, 2017). Mostly though, relevant research on extremism does not necessarily define it,
but rather, measures response agreeability and disagreeability on some sort of extremism scale
(Fernbach et al., 2013) (Prooijen et al., 2015) (Toner et al., 2013). For instance, a study on
extremism by Fernbach Et al. asked respondents about their agreeability with hot-button issues
like a single-payer health care system. Respondents who answered “strongly” were designated as
being politically extreme on this topic (2013). In this way, having an extreme political view on
said ideologies is operationalized as a more objective concept within the scope of these studies.
For all intents and purposes, it seems that previous literature has largely viewed U.S. extremism
as some belief system that is uncompromising or in violation of democratic norms. Possible
examples of a citizen following traditional democratic norms in the U.S. would entail concepts
like; advocating for equality and rejecting racism, participating in civic duties like voting,
engaging in compromise, and so on. In line with this, a commonly held definition of extremism
is that it goes against the “status quo” (Atkins, 2011). This may translate to, “going against a
democratic norm.” In general, previous research does a fairly comprehensive job of viewing
American extremism beyond terms of outward and obvious displays only – like terrorist attacks
for example – and is becoming well-versed on frequent and current norm violations, like through
the usage of media (Chen et al., 2019). For the purposes of this paper, “political extremism” or
“politically extreme ideologies” refers to the violation, or expressed agreement with the
suitability of violating, a democratic norm or norms in the United States (Fernbach et al., 2013)
(Prooijen et al., 2015) (Toner et al., 2013).
Research has explored countless factors on a macro or group level that may explain how
and why someone conforms to extreme ideologies. For one, Americans’ false beliefs in
conspiracy theories or convinced beliefs about something wholly unfounded often predict levels
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of extremism, and are linked to lack of interpersonal trust and other insecurities (Fernbach et al.,
2013) (Goertzel, 1994). More broadly, extremists may feel supported in their beliefs by an
“illusion of understanding,” referring to their inadequate or incorrect knowledge of issues
entirely (Fernbach et al., 2013). As one study showed, once participants realized they did not
understand policies as well as they had thought, they tended to express more moderate views.
The researchers blame this paradox of knowledge on an “unjustified confidence” held by
American voters, and suggest that those who were blindly confident in their extreme beliefs
exhibited a kind of close-mindedness that previous research suggests is related to extremism
(Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Further, not only are these unfounded beliefs often held, but political
extremists tend to ignore other sources of information, leaning heavily on the information being
sourced among their likeminded peers, what research refers to as a “crippled epistemology”
(Hardin, 2002). Therefore, extremists seeking to understand social events may be likely to cherry
pick information from within their streamlined pool of information, continuing on the seemingly
endless cycle of extreme beliefs through the passage of false information. (Prooijen et al., 2015).
This will later be discussed later in terms of an “echo chamber.”
A second broad area of research on this topic concerns understanding extremism through
the micro level – through individual factors like personality. For example, one study examined
individuals who were exposed to terrorism and found that they were more likely to support
extreme political decision making (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). Although this study did not
involve the United States, it might lend an interesting suggestion for U.S. citizens, especially in
light of recent events concerning the January insurrection. Also, those with a “dark triad
personality,” that is, those who exhibit interpersonal callousness, antagonism and malevolence
are more likely to hold extreme views (Gotzsche-Astrup, 2020). It is curious to think if these
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kinds of personality types may be on the rise with trends of growing political cynicism, or if they
are inspired from some sort of political significance in general. Finally, a “quest for personal
significance” is something that has been linked to political extremist ideologies along with a
correlation between higher extremity and higher belief of self-superiority (Kruglanski et al.,
2014) (Toner et al., 2013). Perhaps this quest to find significance can be found individually
among group members, or encourages people in general to join larger organizations.
With these factors considered, political extremism in the U.S. often outwardly ignites
during times of crisis when citizens are distressed and lash out in attempts to cope with or change
the political climate (Atkins, 2011). Interestingly, psychological research suggests that both right
and left extremists may be inspired by extremism from similar psychological lines of reasoning,
but the U.S. is a more likely to home right-wing extremists because they have a much more
prominent footing than left-wing extremists in the country, helping to explain why this group is
heavily focused on in the literature and will continue to be in this paper (Greenberg & Jonas,
2003). The reason for this strong footing will be examined later in this chapter, but relates to the
acceptance of in-group extremism in the GOP. One of the earliest well-known right-wing
extremist groups is the Ku Klux Klan, whose roots go much deeper than the Civil Rights
Movement alone, and are a prime example of all of the ways politics is intertwined with
extremism. Tactics like perpetrating deliberate misinformation and partisanship that give rise to a
general public distrust that formulates into a slew of conspiracy theories and extremist thinking
are central to this group and many others. Not unlike other extremist groups, the KKK was
founded by confederate generals with an influence in politics as a “social group” (Atkins, 2011).
This title attracted many fans of the American public, who may have seen their involvement in a
“harmless” association, as neither extreme nor political at all. Immediately, the Klan, upheld by

10

American political ideals, began perpetrating falsehoods about African Americans – that their
ability to socially integrate would put at risk the lives of white women – as one small example
(Atkins, 2011). Through a political smear campaign that still lives on today, the Klan has been
able to convince a cohort of Americans that non-white, specifically Black Americans, are
dangerous. Later, the Klan would be re-invigorated when Americans – including former
president Wilson – would glorify films like “Birth of a Nation” depicting non-whites in
aggressive lights (Atkins, 2011). Institutionalized racism continues to be blatantly present in the
U.S. (and beyond) due to such extreme and false characterizations.
One general goal of political extremism as the U.S. knows it, is to violate the status quo,
often by rallying around and perpetrating dangerous falsities (that followers may believe are
truths) in an attempt to intellectually sway the masses to join in understanding a specific doctrine
or doctrines. As previous psychological research further suggests, adhering to such intense
ideology stems from multiple facets – personal feelings of closed-mindedness – and external
motives like fear and group dominance, regardless of right or left affiliation (Glaser et al., 2003)
(Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Such beliefs can be so dangerous because it’s supporters are often
unwavering and therefore will stop at little or nothing to advance them. If a goal of extremism is
to at least some extent compel the masses to hear doctrine, then it may be more successful if
backed and furthered by powerful influential political institutions – which as mentioned, is a
common theme in the United States (Mann & Ornstein, 2012).
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How the Modern U.S. Political Sphere Contributes to Extremism in a New Way
When one thinks of a political extremist, the first kind of image that may come to mind
may be that of an unhinged individual charging political buildings while screaming profanities.
While such kinds of action are still very real, as seen with the January insurrection for example,
this is no longer the commonplace scene of U. S. politically extreme ideologies in action. In a
compelling book entitled “It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional
System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism” written by Thomas Mann and Norman
Ornstein, a comprehensive report is given of all of the ways U.S. politics, specifically the GOP,
has set itself up for failure in the last few decades. The authors define something they call a “new
politics” that began emerging in the late 70s, and seems to be in full force today. In this kind of
politics, party affiliation is prioritized as more crucial than national interest (Mann & Ornstein,
2012). For an example, at the end of the 70s, the National Conservative Political Action
Committee began handing out defaming and derogatory fliers of its political opponents, some of
the first of their kind (Mann & Ornstein, 2012). Then, leaders like Newt Gingrich assumed
office, with a primary goal of reshaping the public’s attitude toward congress and destroying
systems of comradery for partisan gain. Political “tools” like derogatory fliers became perfect
ammunition. Gingrich engaged in activities like instructing candidates to use specific language in
speeches to the public such as “pathetic, traitors, radical and sick” to describe the Democratic
party – language never before acceptably used on a regular basis in public discourse (Mann &
Ornstein, 2012). More recently, figures like Mitch McConnell are quoted on record saying things
such as the “Republican brand” being more important than the national interest – words that
would have never left the lips of previous political figureheads (Mann & Ornstein, 2012). The
authors talk about the current day normalcy for politicians to use Fox News as a platform – with
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full disclosure to relay provably false information to their viewers and lead smear campaigns
against the Democratic party. The authors cite that viewers who watch Fox News are
significantly more likely to believe the conspiracy theory that Obama was not born in the United
States, for example (Mann & Ornstein, 2012). Two quotes stand out from the authors in this
section – one being “No lie is too extreme to be published, aired, and repeated, with little or no
repercussion for its perpetrator” and “The impact of all this is to reinforce tribal divisions, while
enhancing a climate where facts are no longer driving debate and deliberation, nor are they
shared by the larger public” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, 62 67). Finally, the authors cite the
growing shift to the right that the GOP continues to engineer in Congress, contrasted with the
increasing levels of distrust Americans have towards government (Mann & Ornstein, 2012).
Mann and Ornstein’s “new politics” is changing the way political information originates,
and perhaps equally as scary, how it is reaching the public sphere. As they discuss, the current
political climate is being poisoned by elites, soaked up by Americans and then regurgitated to the
nation, and is challenging historical democratic norms as the nation has known them. It is not
shocking to find that other current political research is finding similarly concerning trends in
U.S. politics. One convincing study talks about “leapfrog representation.” The preferences of
American voters, most of the time not being extreme, are being ignored in favor of the more
extreme ideologies of their representatives in Congress (Bafumi & Herron, 2010). The study
finds that when one extremist member of congress is replaced, their successor is usually extreme
as well, despite the actual American voters not representing such viewpoints, hence the term
“leapfrog.” This is interesting because it shows a clear link between extremism and actual
political structure, and may help account for the inspiration behind growing levels of extremism
among the masses.
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Finally, the correlation between electoral competition and policy extremism levels lends
another insight into U.S. politics. One study finds that legislators from swing seats are less likely
to respond to the ideological center than seats in safe states. Essentially, the findings imply that
when a legislator is perhaps concerned about holding their seat, they are more worried about
their own partisans – not necessarily what the public is calling for (Gulati, 2004). This further
supports ideas of “leapfrog representation” that suggests American politics do not always reflect
what actual public opinion calls for, and may be therefore fueling, at least in part, a more
extreme America. This concept is in direct support of the work of Mann and Ornstein, and aligns
perfectly with their “new politics” discussion of party over nation.
Today, the United States exists in the chaotic aftermath of the Trump presidency. Mann
and Ornstein’s book was fittingly published just before Trump’s election to office, because
certainly, Trump was the perfect embodiment of their new politics theory. Trump is infamous for
using derogatory and overall painfully divisive language that deteriorated democratic norms
during his campaign and beyond, and he publicly lied more than any other presidential candidate
in U.S. history (Chen et al., 2019). Trump also used the political tactic of instilling fear about
minority groups, calling immigrants “rapists” for example (Scott, 2019). All of his spreading of
misinformation, blatant and dangerous lying and usage of intense divisive language, “exploited”
divisions in the electorate that seemed to attract a large following consistently of, largely
working class white people, enough that he was victorious in 2016 (Abramowitz & McCoy,
2018). All of these tactics, some of which are proven to breed extreme ideologies, made way for
a perfect storm for a new age of extremists by creating intense negative partisanship and
ideological polarization across the board (Abramowitz and McCoy, 2018).
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In previous decades, political leaders were surely affiliated with conspiracy or extremist
groups, but it was certainly not being publicized, and perhaps completely unknown to the public
in most instances. For example, members of the far-right John Birch Society were actually
shunned from the GOP when they came to fruition in the party (Trickley, 2021). At the time, it
was embarrassing for the GOP when prestigious national leaders seen to affiliate with groups
projecting conspiracy theories and extremist viewpoints. When contrasted with the modern farright extremist group Qanon, a group born and bred under the Trump administration, it is a bit
discouraging to see the party’s change of stance on this issue (Aregentino & Amarasingam,
2020). Qanon largely exists in online forums, and is believed to be run by the anonymous “Q”
who provides outlandish predictions about politics. The group wishes to destroy the world as it is
now, and believes that there is a ring of political leaders seeking to demolish American freedom,
with Trump leading an underground revolution that will be brought to light during “The Storm”
(Zuckerman, 2019). As one article suggests, any piece of contradicting evidence can be twisted
into Qanon support under the guise that authentic information is being withheld from the public
(Zuckerman, 2019). Some of those who stormed the Capitol in January supported QAnon and
bore verbiage to the insurrection like “we won’t concede a stolen election,” a complete falsehood
often furthered by QAnon, Trump, and other far right-wing extremists (Pape & Ruby, 2021).
Because Trump has outwardly shown support for some Qanon ideology, and because over
twenty congressional candidates have been public about their Qanon support, members of the
group do not feel marginalized, but accepted (Steck and McDermott, 2020) (Zuckerman, 2019).
In fact, social isolation no longer predicts extremist ideology, and Qanon followers report having
a decent community of friends (Cox, 2021). Qanon is being labeled as the first to have taken the
“participatory” modern internet by storm, hence its rapid spread and support (Zuckerman, 2019).
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It is curious if the “new politics” that Mann and Ornstein warned about could help explain this
situation – if now – through the redefinition of American politics and a broader use of social
media and smear campaigns, create a new sense of community not before seen in the United
States is created. In fact, only with right-wing extremism did exposure to ideological
homogeneity online, result in more extreme views (Warner, 2010). For many, it is still mind
boggling how Trump was able to spew such hatred on such a public scale and retain so many
unwavering supporters. One answer lies in the underbelly of Qanon’s success – the use of media.
How “New Politics” Thrives in Media
In the mid-90s, the way politics was being conducted through media began to drastically
change. New types of media began to gain popularity in the form of broadcast political talk, like
through talk radio and the internet. Political scientists began taking note of how these
“alternative” medias seemed different than “traditional” ones, like through newspaper and
television. Literature around this time makes clear the difference between new media and
traditional media – the goal of new media is to entertain. Garnering this attention is often
achieved by shock value – in the form of making “inflammatory” remarks about political figures
(Davis, 1997).
This literature also warns about talk hosts – who perpetuate these entertainment tactics
and develop close connections to their audience through new veins like the internet (Davis,
1997). The literature posited that traditional media operated under a standard of ethics, while
new media does not, and hinted towards concerns of growing extremist ideals surrounding
consumption of this media (Davis, 1997). Some research even looked directly into this issue, and
found that talk radio in its growing popularity, was associated with negative aspects like
cynicism about government and more extreme attitudes (Hollander, 1996).
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The new age of technology has proven to be an intense force for politics. Politicians can
have their messages broadcasted to the world in seconds, and can interact with Americans with a
single social media post. Similarly, news channels and other political forums can advance their
party’s positions rapidly, reaching millions with ease. As demonstrated with Qanon for example
– Americans are engaging back. The world of media has provided Americans with a unique
platform to digest information and to form communities by sharing their own political beliefs. At
media’s best, it can be a helpful platform for discourse, and at worst, it can ignite extremist
groups together in unison.
Since the 1990s, emerging around the same time as the “new politics” approach began to
take hold, far right extremist groups have found their home in online forums and websites
dedicated specifically to the promotion of their ideals in society (Conway et al., 2019). As an
example of what transpires on these pages, one in particular called “Gab” provided a public
forum for Robert Bowers, the man who murdered over ten people in 2018 at a synagogue in
Pittsburgh. On this page, Bowers made almost 1,000 posts before his attack, with the final one
posted minutes before his killing spree entitled “I’m going in” (Conway et al., 2019). It does not
appear in the literature that this level of formulated online extremism within communities exists
in liberal demographics.
One important concept is that of “deliberative democracy” which is described as the
ability to have meaningful conversations despite differences, and is considered an integral aspect
of democracy as Americans know it (Carpini, 2004) (Chen et al., 2019). On the precipice of the
internet age, it was speculated that with its ability to reach across and connect people together in
a rapid way, it might provide a unique opportunity for increasing deliberation and advancing
deliberative democracy overall (Carpini, 2004). While the internet certainly achieves that goal to
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some extent, it has produced various unfavorable consequences for deliberation through a screen.
With Trump’s presidency in particular having been predicted to increase ideological polarization
and unfavorable partisanship, it is no surprise that much of the political “discourse” taking place
online does not reflect the concept of deliberative democracy, but instead, an environment of
hostility that can breed extremism (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2018).
It is important to consider that with only two political parties dominating U.S. politics,
antagonism on and offline should be expected to occur. In the early 1990s, 21% of Republicans
and 17% of Democrats had “highly unfavorable” views of the opposing party, but by 2016 (the
first year of Trump’s presidency), those numbers had grown to 58% and 55% (Abramowitz &
McCoy, 2018). One study actually supposes that the two-party system itself is largely
responsible for negative campaigning, by showing that once New Zealand switched from a “past
the post” system (reminiscent of two party government) to a mixed member proportional system,
unfavorable campaigning significantly decreased across the board (Ridout & Walter, 2013).
However, it is true that Republicans and Democrats are actually engaging in discourse on social
media apps like Twitter, but seemingly only in the center level (Bright, 2018). This finding
demonstrates that U.S. citizens on the extreme ideological ends are generally not engaging across
lines of belief, and overall have a lower level of online interaction (Bright, 2018). Additionally,
political extremists at either end are likely to form “echo chambers” online where the same
information is bounced back and forth with no real outside educating information (Bright, 2017)
(Prooijen et al., 2015). Further, one study showed that when politically like-minded individuals,
Republican or Democratic, deliberate online, their views tend to become more extreme and
diversity opinion decreases (Schkade, 2010). This seems like another example of the online echo

18

chamber, where opinions are disseminated and endlessly relayed back and forth within the walls
of one community.
Examining public discourse on online news sites has found a similar pattern of the
breakdown of democratic norms that were present in Trump’s comments during the campaign
(Chen et al., 2019). In this research, “incivility” and “impoliteness” were examined in news
comments, with an uncivil comment being denoted by the usage of xenophobic comments, racial
slurs, and so on, behaviors that within the scope of this paper can be viewed as extreme. The
study interestingly found that comments tended to exhibit more traits of deliberative democracy
later in campaigns, but this trend was not found in comments posted on Fox News online, where
uncivil discourse was not uncommon at any point (Chen et al., 2019). Additionally, many news
organizations are moving their commenting features onto Facebook (Su et al., 2018). What’s
been found is that incivility and impoliteness are more likely on conservative news sites on
Facebook, and that among uncivil comments, conservative news pages are seen to harbor the
most extremely uncivil ones (Su et al., 2018). Republicans are also more likely to lie on Twitter
than Democratic candidates, this being partly attributed to Donald Trump’s presidency (Kenski
et al., 2018). It is not shocking that many research concerning online discourse occurred during
Trump’s tenure, where his violation of discourse norms like lying and name calling may have
carried over to his American supporters, some of whom seemed to exhibit the same trends (Chen
et al., 2019).
Facebook has proven to show a few interesting social trends with commenters. As
mentioned earlier, many news sites have moved their comments onto Facebook, despite the fact
that Facebook users do not assume their audience to be any more intelligent or reasonable or so
on, than on news sites (Kim et al., 2018). Facebook users also do not perceive any sort of
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difference in quality or the civil nature of discourse on Facebook compared to news sites (Kim et
al., 2018). Interestingly, some findings report that indeed, the quality of Facebook political
comments is higher than that of news sources, but this research was not conducted among
American news sources (Hille & Bakker, 2014). Regardless, this purports that because of the
anonymity factor – those on Facebook are posting with their username, and therefore post higher
quality political comments less frequently than on news platforms (Hille & Bakker, 2014).
Conversely, a similar study in the United States found that deliberative discourse seems to be
higher on news websites (The Washington Post) than on Facebook, the total opposite findings
(Rowe, 2014). Perhaps this suggests that Americans are less concerned about the factor of
anonymity when engaging in potentially uncivil online discourse, because it seems to be quite
commonplace.
One thing is certain – political discourse in the United States is not always uplifting, and
the U.S. far-right has seemingly found its place in modern media in a profound way. Even as
recently as this past year, a survey from PRRI Research found that Republicans who trust Fox
News and far-right news outlets are likely to think Trump’s recent bid for election was stolen
from him (PRRI Staff, 2021). The question of what exact medias those with extreme ideologies
may be using, and whether or not these may predict extreme ideologies, will be examined further
in this paper
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CHAPTER II
Methodology
Measuring Extremism
Extremism is a force in U.S. politics that seems to have been reinforced in the media. My
first set of dependent variables are the components seeking to measure extremism. While
defining extremism is difficult because of its subjective nature, one important differentiation is
between extreme ideologies and extreme partisanship. For example, someone may intensely
support anti-democratic racist ideals, but this doesn’t necessarily mean they are also strongly
Republican, the two notions of extremism are not one in the same. In this chapter, the focus will
remain on anti-democratic extremism, and party affiliation will be further explored later. Note
that when quantifying extremism, this paper will remain focused on anti-democratic responses.
Further, as mentioned earlier, deliberative democracy entails purposeful dialogue that attempts to
make sense of differences – and may be especially necessary for controversial topics. It is
considered integral to what makes a democracy whole. Therefore, when someone strongly agrees
with the following statement:

“What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles”

it is assumed that they have little to no apparent exception or give to their anti-democratic stance
on the issues. An answer like this corresponds to the “new politics” idea of limited deliberative
democracy and overall hard and fast stances on hot-button issues that often find a home in
partisan media sources.
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In an attempt to predict modern-day extremism through a similar lens, this paper employs
data from the American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES, founded in 1948,
surveys Americans to examine public opinion and voting behavior. In 2020, a time-series study
was released from the ANES that consisted of over 8,000 pre-election interviews and over 7,000
post-election interviews. Questions ask respondents to report demographic information, answer
questions regarding voting patterns, and most importantly to this research, report agreeability on
a vast array of questions – including but not limited to – questions about government funding and
Trump’s handling of COVID-19 (ANES 2020). This time-series study also included extensive
questions about the media and its consumption. Largely for this reason, the ANES 2020 study
proved crucial to this paper. Data like current issue response agreeability, political party
identification, age, type and amount of media consumption, and more, were all included in one
place and can be used repeatedly in this paper. Other organizations like the General Social
Survey did not have as fruitful, current and comprehensive information relating to my research
question.
Considering that previous conversation talks about the “party over nation” approach of
new politics that was largely spearheaded by powerful elites and promotes elitism and
superiority in general, questions that address those themes are of interest to this paper, as
responses may suggest a correlation between these beliefs among the masses and their extreme
beliefs in general. The following dependent variables, chosen for this research and listed in
question format from the time-series study below, asked respondents their level of agreeability,
ranging from one (disagree strongly) to five (agree strongly):
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Dependent Variable 1: Compromise: (v202409): “What people call compromise in
politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.”
Dependent Variable 2: Strong Leader: (v202413): “Having a strong leader in government
is good for the U.S., even if they bend the rules to get things done.”

These variables seem to speak directly to deliberative democracy and its recent
deterioration as it stands now. Speaking to DV #1, the literature revealed that among government
elites this anti-compromise position is relatively strong, and as evidenced in media and beyond, a
similar mentality is growing amongst the American public (Mann & Ornstein, 2016). Thus,
answers to this question may help explain if Americans have some generally engrained extremist
ideology in general. Finally, the inspiration behind choosing DV #2, concerning a strong leader
bending the rules, is similar to that of #1. In general, U.S. leaders fit the norm of appearing
“political” to the public – that is – engaging in deliberative democracy, playing by the “rules”
and appearing wholesome. Therefore, as a blanket statement it would be against U.S. democratic
norms for a leader to “bend the rules” to accomplish things, at least, in the eyes of voters.
Agreeing strongly with this statement may also suggest some sort of engrained extremist
ideology. Also, previous research finds, especially in the last few years during and after Trump’s
presidency, polarizing and extreme view differentiation has been on the rise in this country, and
much of this erosion can be seen online (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2018). Because of the
thoroughly polarizing previous presidency, this question is even more relevant and may elicit
responses of agreeability or disagreeability that are very telling of such polarization.
Table 3.0 below shows information about these dependent variables, including
frequencies and percentages of extreme responses to these questions from the entirety of the
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dataset. While these numbers don’t lend to deeper analysis, they are a good beginning to this
research as they lay the foundation for baseline statements, like, how many respondents from the
ANES data answered in what way to the DVs in question. The (N) denotes the number of
respondents:

Table 3.0
Response
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor
disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Compromise (N)
15.4%
(1134)

Strong leader (N)
24.7%
(1814)

22.8%
(1680)
31.6%
(2325)
(23.4%)
(1718)
6.8%
(499)

24.4%
(1792)
19.6%
(1440)
23%
(1689)
8.5%
(623)

Media Usage and Extremism
Research has shown that modern media creates a fertile environment for extreme
attitudes to gain traction and support. But exactly what mediums may encourage these attitudes
the most, like content or platform, has not been extensively considered in the post-Trump era.
Understanding exactly what kinds of media may foster the most extreme attitudes would be of
great importance to a larger understanding of extremism’s interaction with the media. Due to the
aforementioned subjective nature of extremism and the wide variety of political media that one
may consume, I have chosen a quantitative analysis for this topic. In this way, the interaction
between media and extremism may be more objective within the bounds of this paper, or at least,
appear more concise and easier to interpret analytically.
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The ANES is an excellent source for understanding the public’s use of media. Questions
about respondent’s radio, television, internet and newspaper consumption were all posed,
including exactly which programs are being consumed. The list of possibilities included rightwing and left-wing channels as well as some more independent sources. As the literature
suggests, the American two-party system has seemingly led to a unique kind of polarization and
a “you against me” mentality. For these reasons, American media is often seen as divisive on its
face. Because of this, independent variables were specifically chosen that encompass some of the
most popular, and also most clearly party affiliated, sources of media. All of these platforms
have a very similarly reported viewership, for example, the number of people who regularly read
the Wall Street Journal is similar to those who regularly read the New York Times. This can help
draw a clear differentiation between party and extremism in media, if any. As seen in the
literature, there is an important distinction between traditional medias like television and
newspapers, and alternative media like radio and internet, so both were included in this research
(Davis, 1997).
The ANES listed sources like the Tucker Carlson television program, the Dave Ramsey
radio show, and so on. The variables below include a complete outlook when applied together,
and can hopefully adequately speak to the consumption of American media. For all of the media
questions, the ANES asked: “Which of the following (radio, TV, newspaper or internet sources)
do you consume regularly? Please check any that you listen to at least once a month.”
Respondents can answer with yes or no, or can refuse to answer at all. I recoded responses so
that any participants who refused to respond were omitted from consideration. Table 3.1 shows
which media variables were chosen for this paper, along with how many respondents say they
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use them regularly which is denoted by (N). Additionally, percentage of Republicans, Democrats
and Independents is considered among users:

Table 3.1
Media Type (N)

Republican Users
(%)
43.9

Democratic Users
(%)
45.1

Independent Users
(%)
11

13

80.4

6.6

90.9

5.9

3.3

7.2

86.7

6.1

72.3

20.1

7.7

CNN Online (1477)

20.5

70.3

9.2

Hannity Radio Show (345)

93

4.1

2.9

NPR Fresh Air Radio Show
(559)

15.4

80.1

4.5

Wall Street Journal
Newspaper (238)
New York Times
Newspaper (378)
Hannity Television Show
(427)
Rachel Maddow Television
Show (360)
Fox Online (1072)
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CHAPTER III
Hypotheses
These hypotheses seek to address key questions from previous research. They are posed
in order to learn more about the effects of media on partisanship and extremism. They are
concise, and addressed statistically in similar ways:
Hypothesis 1: “Republicans will hold more anti-democratic ideals than Independents and
Democrats”
This first hypothesis is important in laying a ground work for the rest of the paper.
Subsequent hypotheses pose ideas about extremity among bipartisan news channels, and so first
determining if one party in general is more anti-democratically extreme than another, acts as a
control and ground work for further discussion. Additionally, party identification has been an
important and significant consideration in previous research, and so it should be thoroughly
addressed here. The first step in testing this hypothesis is a bivariate analysis. Table 3.2 shows
the mean response for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans from this data set. By just
analyzing the means, the table suggests that Republicans typically hold more extreme ideas on
these views than independents and Democrats. Table 3.3 employs a difference of means test
between Democratic and Republican responses at a significance value of 0.05 to further analyze
if the results between Republicans and Democrats are statistically significant.
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Table 3.2
Extremity among party
ID

Compromise
Mean (N)

Strong Leader
Mean (N)

Democrats

2.56 (3426)

2.28 (3430)

Republicans

3.12 (3048)

3.08 (3043)

Independents

2.91 (861)

2.70 (863)

Table 3.3
Difference of means (p-value)
COMPROMISE

Difference of means (p-value)
STRONG LEADER

0.56
(P < 0.0001)

0.80
(P < 0.0001)

For both dependent variables, the results are significant. For a result to be statistically
significant at a value of 0.05, this means that with 95% certainty these results are real and not
due to chance, and that on these issues, Republicans are significantly more extreme in their
views than Democrats. Aforementioned research has uncovered similar findings when it comes
to party differences. Although these findings are promising in verifying the hypothesis, a
multiple regression is necessary to validate the effects of party identification on anti-democratic
sentiment. This test allows me to control for other demographic variables that might have an
influence on the relationship in question. For this regression, I controlled for several
demographic variables. Running this test can allow for certainty that party ID – not these other
demographic variables – is causing the extremity in response. A multiple regression was
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conducted for each dependent variable. The adjusted r squared variable denotes how much
variation of the dependent variables is explained by the independent media variables. Results are
shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5 below.
Like party ID, a series of demographic variables were listed on the ANES data set for
respondents to answer. Among them, some of the most relevant to this thesis were: race, sex,
education, and age. I recoded these variables on SPSS, as many of them contained a multitude of
responses. For example, as a respondent gives their age, this number could vary drastically, and
therefore could yield around eighty different responses for one variable. Below shows how each
demographic variable was recoded for this analysis, along with their variable number from the
ANES data set:

Party Identification: (v201231x) 0 = Independent 1 = Strong Republican, Not very strong
Republican, Independent-Republican -1 = Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat,
Independent-Democrat
Race: (v201549x) 1 = white 0 = non-white
Sex: (v201600) 1 = male 0 = female
Education: (v201511x) 1 = less than high school 2 = high school credential 3 = some post-high
school, no bachelor’s degree 4 = Bachelor’s degree 5 = Graduate degree
Age: (v201507x) 1 = 18-39 2 = 40-64 3 = 65-80
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Table 3.4
Extremity –Compromise
Beta

P-Value

Constant

4.08

Party ID

.30

<0.001

Race

-.36

<0.001

Sex

-.10

<0.001

Education

-.24

<0.001

Age

-.05

.003

N = 6925
Adjusted r squared = .134

Table 3.5
Extremity –
Strong Leader

Beta

Constant

3.70

Party ID

.42

<0.001

Race

-.29

<0.001

Sex

-.10

<0.001

Education

-.18

<0.001

Age

-.07

<0.001

N = 6925
Adjusted r squared = 0.125

P-Value
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The multiple regression tables reveal interesting findings. For one, demographic variables
across the board hold statistical significance in all of these cases. These findings suggest that
other demographic variables, beyond party identification, are important in considering the higher
extremity level of Republicans. Additionally, almost all of these effects are well past the 0.05
threshold of significance, meaning that they are all seriously important variables to consider. The
next step is a test of magnitude. Determining the marginal effects within a regression like this
reveals just how weak or strong the impact of a change in one variable has on the outcome
variable, while the others are held constant. For the tables below, the marginal effect was
calculated for the two farthest ends of the spectrum for each independent variable. For example,
Republican to Democrat, white to non-white, youngest group to oldest group, and so on. In
analyzing each variable, the others were held constant. For instance, when evaluating the effects
of race, all of the other variables remained the same (Republican, male, less than high school
education, and youngest age group). This was repeated for each variable. Tables 3.6 and 3.7
below examine marginal effects of the most extreme magnitude of each variable. Determining
the marginal effects of each variable post-regression will aid in understanding how impactful
their presence is on the dependent variable.
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Table 3.6
Variable (compromise)

Range

Size of Effect

Party ID

Democrat – Republican

0.59

Race

White – Non-white

-0.36

Sex

Male – Female

-0.10

Education

Less than HS - Graduate

-0.97

Age

Youngest – Oldest

-0.10

Variable (strong leader)

Range

Size of Effect

Party ID

Democrat – Republican

0.85

Race

White – Non-white

-0.29

Sex

Male – Female

-0.10

Education

Less than HS - Graduate

-0.71

Age

Youngest – Oldest

-0.14

Table 3.7

The marginal effects tables reveal interesting results. For party ID, the marginal
effects for both dependent variables are fairly large considering they’re on a five-point scale. For
instance, party ID for strong leader is 0.85. This number reveals that, holding all other variables
constant, Republicans are predicted to be 0.85 higher on response extremity than their
democratic counterparts. This shows that there’s almost an entire one point scale difference
between the two parties on this issue. A few other variables are worth mentioning for having a
higher magnitude. Out of all of the variables, education had the greatest magnitude, even more so
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than party ID. Like party ID, those with the least education were almost an entire point more
extreme on each issue than those with the highest education.
For the issue of compromise on the race variable, non-white respondents were close to
half a point more extreme in their responses compared to their non-white counterparts.
Interestingly though, this magnitude was smaller for the issue of strong leader – however nonwhites also reported more extreme responses. For both dependent variables, sex and age did not
have a large magnitude, meaning that the impact of this significance is not as drastic as the other
variables. This hypothesis is confirmed, that indeed on these issues, Republicans hold more
extreme views than Independents and Democrats.
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Hypothesis 2: “Consumption of conservative media will lead to more anti-democratic ideals than
consumption of liberal media”
In the literature review, discussion around political extremism in media focused heavily
on party ID. Especially in light of Republican extremist groups and their use of media forums
like those supporting Qanon ideals, and in light of Republican media usage and perpetuation in
general, it would make sense to hypothesize that these types of media may elicit more extreme
responses (Pape & Ruby, 2021) (Conway et al., 2019). This hypothesis builds on previous
questions, and proposes that consuming conservative media will in-turn, lead to more antidemocratic ideals than consuming liberal media (Su et al., 2018). This hypothesis is really the
heart and soul of the analysis in this paper. To begin, I examined right and left leaning radio
shows (Hannity and NPR Fresh Air), newspapers (Wall Street Journal and New York Times),
online news outlets (Fox Online and CNN Online) and TV channels (Hannity and Maddow). Out
of the limited supply of partisan-comparable networks to choose from, these aligned most closely
in terms of strongest and most relevant partisan viewership. NPR Fresh Air was chosen over
other NPR channels like Marketplace, because according to the NPR website, Fresh Air is most
comparable to an opinion-based news outlet like Hannity, whereas Marketplace is a more
informative program about the U.S. economic system (NPR 2022).
From a simple difference of means test between each set of right and left leaning sources,
in every single instance for each dependent variable, the right-wing source saw higher levels of
extremism than the left-wing source (see Appendix A). There isn’t a single instance where a leftwing news source saw higher response extremity levels than a right-wing one. It was also often
the case that results were statistically significant. For additional consideration, some may argue
the validity of a media like the Wall Street Journal as a “conservative” newspaper. Although the
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Wall Street Journal may be more weakly associated with conservativism than other newspapers,
it was the closest to such that was offered in the data set. Table 3.1 shows that users of the Wall
Street Journal were fairly evenly Republicans and Democrats.
The most seriously extreme variation came from comparing Hannity Radio and NPR
Fresh Air. Here, the difference in extreme responses for both dependent variables was drastically
different, and had very significant differences. These two variables were analyzed further, as
they clearly had significantly different partisan viewership. Table 3.8 illustrates these
differences.
Table 3.8

Extremism – Mean

Hannity Radio (N)

NPR Fresh Air (N)

Strong Leader

3.14 (307)

1.89 (526)

Difference of Means
(p-value)
1.25
(<0.0001)

Compromise

3.28 (307)

2.04 (525)

1.24
(<0.0001)

Because these findings were so drastic, the second analysis of this hypothesis focused
specifically on radio programs. This was done not only for the sake of parsimony, but also
because these differences unanimously existed across the board of all variables, as demonstrated
in the initial analysis in this hypothesis. Additionally, because the demographic variables were so
significant in the first hypothesis, they have to be controlled for in hypothesis two to verify that
consuming right-wing news is the reason for extreme responses, not some other confounding
variable. To do this, a multiple regression was employed for each dependent variable. The results
are in tables 3.9 – 3.12 below:
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Table 3.9
Compromise – Hannity
Radio

Beta

Constant

4.17

Hannity Radio

.34

<.001

Party ID

.27

<.001

Race

-.34

<.001

Gender

-.080

.035

Education

-.27

<.001

Age

-.11

<.001

P-Value

N = 3342
Adjusted r squared = .145
Table 3.10
Strong Leader – Hannity
Radio

Beta

Constant

3.40

Hannity Radio

.24

.002

Party ID

.46

<.001

Race

-.22

<.001

Gender

-.060

.157

Education

-.13

<.001

Age

-.10

<.001

N = 3341
Adjusted r squared = .143

P-Value
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Table 3.11
Compromise – NPR
Fresh Air Radio

Beta

Constant

4.07

NPR Fresh Air Radio

-.47

<.001

Party ID

.25

<.001

Race

-.30

<.001

Gender

-.06

.101

Education

-.24

<.001

Age

-.07

.005

P-Value

N = 3342
Adjusted r squared = .157
Table 3.12
Strong Leader – NPR
Fresh Air Radio

Beta

Constant

3.31

NPR Fresh Air Radio

-.38

<.001

Party ID

.44

<.001

Race

-.19

<.001

Gender

-.05

.276

Education

-.10

<.001

Age

-.07

.013

N = 3341
Adjusted r squared = .151

P-Value
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The multiple regressions reveal very interesting results that help to prove this hypothesis
in every instance. On the compromise variables, the regression shows that all other things equal,
consuming a certain media program significantly impacts the likelihood of giving an antidemocratic response. For media, all of the significance values were <.001 with the exception of
Hannity Radio on the issue of strong leader, where the value was .002. All of these numbers are
well above the significance threshold of 0.05, meaning that these findings are very likely not due
to chance.
Because media consumption was significant in the regression for all of the analyses, the
magnitude of these comparisons should be further examined to determine how strong the effect
is. This comparison is conducted in tables 3.13 and 3.14 below for both of the independent
variables across both of the dependent variables.
Table 3.13
Variable (Compromise)

Range

Size of Effect

Type of media consumption

NPR Radio – Hannity Radio

.81

Variable (Strong Leader)

Range

Size of Effect

Type of media consumption

NPR Radio – Hannity Radio

.63

Table 3.14

The magnitude for both of these media variables is clearly very high. These numbers
show that both magnitudes are closer to a full point than a half a point different. In other words,
Republicans are scoring .81 higher on extremity levels for compromise, and .63 higher on
extremity levels for strong leader. For context, the reader should recall that the dependent
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variables are both on five-point scales. Therefore, the hypothesis that conservative media leads to
higher extremist ideals than consumption of liberal media, has been proven.
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Hypothesis 3: “Consumption of conservative commentary will lead to more anti-democratic
responses than consumption of conservative news.”
This hypothesis was conducted in hopes of establishing a clearer line between exactly
what content respondents are consuming on what channels. For example, in hypothesis 2, it was
clearly established that those who utilized Fox Online were more extreme in their responses than
those who utilized CNN Online (see Appendix A). However, while these outlets are definitely
partisan in nature, what’s not clear is exactly what information respondents are consuming on the
website. It’s probably the case that some users are strictly following the news, while others are
consuming the opinions of a nightly news commentator. This begs a different question – what
kind of information is causing varying extremity response levels? A similar scenario could
potentially exist for all of the media variables – television, internet and newspaper, with perhaps
the exception of radio considering Hannity and NPR Fresh Air are primarily commentary
sources.
Unfortunately for the internet variable, the ANES data set did not offer more specific
variables that might allow us to narrow this research. For instance, no surveyed question existed
that asked, “do you utilize Fox online for opinion-based commentary or as a news source?” In
fact, this kind of question did not exist for any of the variables except television. In this instance,
Tucker Carlson and Bret Baier both have a program on Fox, and the data set included questions
about respondent’s consumption of each source. Technically, according to the time of day that
they air, Carlson is a “commentator” while Baier is a “news reporter” (Stelter, 2009). In reality,
the line between what is news and what is commentary has been blurred on Fox news in recent
years. Regardless, this was the most straightforward pairing of variables to address this question.
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Initially, I coded a variable that combined the viewership of both Carlson and Baier. In
SPSS, the recode looked like: 0=watch neither, 1=watch Baier, 2=watch Carlson, 3=watch both.
In doing this, I was able to determine what users consumed only Carlson, only Baier, or both
channels, for each dependent variable. There was virtually no difference or effect with separating
who watched what channels in this way (see Appendix B). Below is a table showing the
difference of means in extremity response among those who simply consume Carlson and Baier
for each dependent variable. Table 3.15 below examines each variable independently:

Table 3.15
Difference of
Means (p-value)

Extremism (Mean)

Baier TV (N)

Carlson TV (N)

Compromise

3.20 (285)

3.24 (403)

0.04
(0.6853)

Strong Leader

3.08 (285)

3.21 (403)

0.13
(0.1960)

As seen in the above table, virtually no difference existed between the two means, and
the results were far from statistically significant for both variables. The p-values were nowhere
close to 0.05. Because of this, the hypothesis that right-wing commentary leads to more extreme
responses than right-wing news, can be rejected. It could be possible that different implications
exist for different types of media, but at least for television, this hypothesis does not hold water.
Perhaps this suggests that the line between commentary and news on Fox is so blurred that
viewers aren’t noticing a difference, and are therefore reporting similar response extremity for
both kinds of programs.
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Hypothesis 4: “Consumption of alternative media (Talk Radio, Internet) will lead to more antidemocratic ideals than consumption of traditional media (Newspapers, TV).”
This hypothesis came about from a distinction drawn in previous research. A huge
amount of work on this topic in the last decade centers around alternative media, while older
research focuses more on traditional news sources. Further, as seen in the literature review,
previous research supports the idea that alternative media seem to lead to greater extremity than
traditional media (Davis, 1997) (Hollander, 1996). After running some basic comparisons across
these medias by comparing differences of means, it was clear that some interesting significant
differences did exist between alternative and traditional media (see Appendix A) To further
examine this hypothesis, I focused on newspaper and television as “traditional” media, and radio
and internet as “alternative” media. The mean extremism scores for each medium are displayed
in Table 3.16. As a way of controlling for the ideological bias of these media, I have chosen all
right-wing sources.
On the question of compromise, radio listeners are the most extreme but television
viewers are not far behind with internet users and newspaper readers exhibiting considerably less
extremism. When it comes to strong leadership, there is little variation among all four media:
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Table 3.16
Extremism (Mean)

Compromise (N)

Strong Leader (N)

WSJ Paper

2.28 (218)

2.97 (966)

Fox Online

2.52 (219)

2.94 (965)

Hannity Radio

3.28 (307)

3.14 (307)

Hannity TV

3.23 (382)

3.11 (382)

In order to determine if these results hold up under greater scrutiny, a multiple regression
was run between each media type with the same demographics employed in previous analyses
(party ID, race, sex, education and age). Many of these demographics proved to be significant.
Complete results can be found in Appendix C. Table 3.17 shows the beta coefficients for the
media outlets in question. Together they shed some light on hypothesis 4. For both dependent
variables, newspapers lag behind the other three media types. In fact, reading the Wall Street
Journal makes one significantly less likely to denigrate compromise. There is virtually no impact
of newspaper reading when it comes to the strong leader question. On both questions, radio is
clearly the form of media most associated with extremism. These findings lend support to
hypothesis 4. However, television comes in second place on the compromise variable and closely
trails internet usage on the strong leader variable. So, hypothesis 4 cannot be completely
confirmed or denied. The data suggests mixed results when it comes to my fourth and final
hypothesis. Only sometimes does utilizing alternative media lead to more extreme responses than
utilizing traditional media.

43

Potential explanations for these findings exist. On the issue of newspaper, it could be the
case that level of clear partisanship is more highly related to extremism than the actual form of
media in general. In other words, maybe it’s less important that the Wall Street Journal is a
newspaper, and more important that it’s quite moderate. This moderate outlook, with Table 3.1
again showing comparable Wall Street Journal viewership rates between Republicans and
Democrats, may help explain why users are less likely to denigrate compromise. As seen in
hypothesis two, it’s not surprising that radio, once again, yielded the most extreme results. Yet,
the television variable was more extreme than expected across the board. Similarly to the
situation with newspaper, perhaps what’s more critical to extreme responses is not that Hannity
TV is a TV show, but that Hannity TV is a media source with clear far-right partisanship.
Perhaps this is driving the extreme responses, and not the source itself.

Table 3.17
Compromise (p-value)

Strong Leader (p-value)

WSJ Paper

-.34 (<.001)

.02 (.795)

Fox Online

.10 (.018)

.17 (<.001)

Hannity Radio

.34 (<.001)

.24 (.002)

Hannity TV

.22 (<.001)

.14 (.038)
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CHAPTER IV:
Conclusion
In all, this project revealed interesting, and mostly expected, findings about U.S.
extremism and media. Hypotheses 1, 2 were supported by the data, hypothesis 3 was not, and
hypothesis 4 was partially supported. The findings that Republicans report more anti-democratic
extremist responses than Democrats, and the fact that Conservative media leads to more extreme
responses than Liberal media, were both explored in previous literature, and have been proven
again here. There was no statistical indication that watching Fox commentary over Fox news
encourages more extremist responses, and I also cannot definitively say that using alternative
media consistently relates to higher levels of response extremity on these issues.
I suspected that similar patterns may exist between the dependent variables of this study.
For example, perhaps the compromise question would consistently see higher levels of
extremism, or vice versa. Ultimately, a pattern like this didn’t definitively exist between the
variables. There were instances when the compromise question saw higher levels of extremity,
and other times when the strong leader variable did.
Generally, I was surprised that many of the demographic variables were as impactful as
they proved to be in the multiple regression. For example, education and age proved to be very
significant factors in most of the analyses. Another shocking factor was that often, non-white
respondents reported higher levels of extremity than white respondents. This is surprising in
general, but specifically interesting considering that there are typically more non-white people
associated with the Democratic party, yet Democrats were less extreme in this study. I believe
that the likely explanation for this is that the ANES data set used in this paper was surveyed
during the contentious Trump presidency, and was released in 2020 when race relations were
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extremely tumultuous in the nation. While non-white Americans have always been discriminated
against, Trump’s presidency beckoned explicit and overt discrimination in the nation to a degree
that social movements, like the Black Lives Matter movement, garnered peak attention. It could
likely be the case that many non-white respondents in this study were feeling disillusioned with
concepts concerning compromise and what it means to be a strong leader, yielding a higher
response extremity on these issues.
A few limitations exist in this study with most of them relating to the media data that is
offered in the ANES data set. One concerns the pool of independent political media variables
that the ANES data set offers. While they are numerous, especially for categories like television
shows, they don’t always offer the most clearly partisan sources for comparison. For example,
the Wall Street Journal was the most “far-right” newspaper to choose from. Perhaps it would be
the fact that a more specific, and more far-right paper would have yielded more extreme
responses. Additionally, the nature of the questions about usage also prove more challenging for
research. As mentioned earlier, questions fail to specifically ask what content users are
consuming on these platforms, and this can pose a difficulty for variables like television and
internet, where content can consist of non-political topics, like a weather report.
In line with this, another limitation concerns the usage of the internet not being addressed
as adequately as it could be. Once again, the ANES data set asks questions like “how often do
you use Twitter, or Reddit?” But this is not enough information to determine political activity on
these sites, and so these questions could not be used in this study. This is unfortunate,
considering that a large pool of previous research, especially since Trump’s presidency, concerns
online forums, Facebook, and so on. For future datasets, this would be a useful point for the
ANES to cover, and for future research to explore.
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For future research, it could also be interesting to address other dependent variables
besides the two in this study. The ANES data set provided a massive amount of controversial
questions that exist in U.S. public discourse today. Questions like “how strongly do you agree
with abortion” “do you agree that the poor should be offered more money by the government”
and so on, were posed to respondents. In the context of this paper, the focus remained on antidemocratic extremism. For many hot-button issues like these, it is not so clear-cut when
determining what kind of response constitutes an “anti-democratic” notion. These questions in
the ANES data set could make for an interesting paper covering extreme U.S. ideals, but perhaps
not one focusing on anti-democratic sentiment.
Mostly, these findings echo those of previous research. Importantly, they help show that
anti-democratic sentiment, specifically among Republicans and conservative media in this study,
is alive and well. Findings in this paper can help further explain how and why Republicans found
a community through far-right media, gathered together, and attacked the Capitol building on
January 6th, 2021. It would be extremely interesting to repeat this study with the next time-series
study issued by the ANES. Again, the responses utilized in this paper reflect those of Americans
living in the Trump presidency, and at the beginning of the COVID pandemic. It could be the
case that by the next time-series study, U.S. citizens feel less national division, and report less
extreme responses overall.
This research is important because it lends itself to the larger paradigm of politics and
media — specifically during the Trump presidency — which will likely be an area of interest in
politics for decades to come. It helps further the notion that politics and media are directly
connected, and are often even one in the same. Research like this can be used to further
understand domestic extremism in the U.S. and potentially how to predict response extremity on
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certain issues. The “solution” to deterring extreme ideas being encouraged by the media may not
exist, simply because it is so engrained in what U.S. citizens know political media to look like.
Media bias to some degree is inevitable, but at what point does “bias” become so severe that it
fosters extremist attitudes? In the context of this study, media like Hannity Radio are guilty of
this to some extent. Is it possible to have a media whose motto is to appeal to the moderate voter
in the U.S. by means of committing to consistently less-than-extreme interpretations? If this type
of media existed, it’s curious if a lack of “shock value” would push even the moderate viewer
away, or if it would become an American staple. At its best, a media like this may deter antidemocratic extremism.
At the end of this study, I cannot definitively say that extreme responses on these issues
are caused by utilizing a certain kind of media. What I can say is that there is a correlation, that
is often significant, between right-wing media usage and extreme responses on the issues in this
paper. This correlation continues to exist even when other variables are controlled for. I look
forward to future research on this ever-evolving topic of U.S. extremism and its functions in
media.
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Appendix A.
Table A1
Extremism – Mean

WSJ Newspaper (N)

NYT Newspaper (N)

Difference of Means
(p-value)

Strong Leader

2.52
(219)

1.96
(349)

0.56
(<0.0001)

Compromise

2.28
(218)

2.17
(348)

0.11
(<0.2599)

Extremism – Mean

FOX Online (N)

CNN Online (N)

Difference of Means
(p-value)

Strong Leader

2.94
(965)

2.30
(1349)

0.64
(<0.0001)

Compromise

2.97
(966)

2.51
(1348)

0.46
(<0.0001)

Extremism – Mean
Strong Leader

Hannity TV (N)
3.11
(382)

Maddow TV (N)
2.13
(327)

Difference of Means
(p-value)
0.9811
(<0.0001)

Compromise

3.23
(382)

2.33
(326)

0.90
(<0.0001)

Hannity Radio (N)

NPR Radio (N)

Difference of Means
(p-value)

3.14
(307)

1.90
(526)

1.25
(<0.0001)

3.28
(307)

2.04
(525)

1.24
(<0.0001)

Table A2

Table A3

Table A4
Extremism – Mean
Strong Leader

Compromise
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Appendix B
Table B1
Extremism –
Mean

Watch Neither (N)

Watch Baier (N)

Watch Carlson (N)

Watch Both (N)

Compromise

2.77
(5216)

3.12
(185)

3.20
(303)

3.34
(1.12)

Strong Leader

2.60
(5217)

2.96
(185)

3.18
(1.25)

3.29
(100)

Table B2
Compromise

P-Value

Watch Baier vs. Watch
Carlson

0.47

Table B3
Strong Leader

P-Value

Watch Baier vs. Watch
Carlson

0.07
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Appendix C
Table C1
Compromise – Wall
Street Journal

Beta

Constant

4.16

WSJ Paper

-.34

<.001

Party ID

.31

<.001

Race

-.40

<.001

Sex

-.03

.500

Education

-.25

<.001

Age

-.12

<.001

P-Value

N = 2185
Adjusted r squared = .15 ^
Table C2
Strong Leader – Wall
Street Journal

Beta

Constant

3.50

WSJ Paper

.02

.795

Party ID

.51

<.001

Race

-.30

<.001

Sex

-.13

.010

Education

-.14

<.001

Age

-.06

.058

N = 2186
Adjusted r squared = .16 ^

P-Value
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Table C3
Compromise – Fox
Online

Beta

Constant

4.11

Fox Online

.10

.018

Party ID

.29

<.001

Race

-.37

<.001

Sex

-.14

<.001

Education

-.24

<.001

Age

-.08

<.001

P-Value

N = 4561
Adjusted r squared = .14 ^
Table C4
Strong Leader – Fox
Online

Beta

Constant

3.52

Fox Online

.17

<.001

Party ID

.45

<.001

Race

-.27

<.001

Sex

-.10

.004

Education

-.14

<.001

Age

-.10

<.001

N = 4562
Adjusted r squared = .14 ^

P-Value
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Table C5
Compromise –
Hannity Radio

Beta

Constant

4.17

Hannity Radio

.34

<.001

Party ID

.27

<.001

Race

-.34

<.001

Sex

-.08

.035

Education

-.27

<.001

Age

-.11

<.001

P-Value

N = 3342
Adjusted R squared = .15 ^
Table C6
Strong Leader –
Hannity Radio

Beta

Constant

3.40

Hannity Radio

.24

.002

Party ID

.46

<.001

Race

-.22

<.001

Sex

-.06

.157

Education

-.13

<.001

Age

-.10

<.001

N = 3341
Adjusted r squared = .14

P-Value
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Table C7
Compromise –
Hannity TV

Beta

Constant

4.14

Hannity TV

.22

<.001

Party ID

.28

<.001

Race

-.36

<.001

Sex

-.09

.002

Education

-.26

<.001

Age

-.07

<.001

P-Value

N = 5492
Adjusted r squared = .14 ^
Table C8
Strong Leader –
Hannity TV

Beta

Constant

3.64

Hannity TV

.14

.038

Party ID

.47

<.001

Race

-.24

<.001

Sex

-.11

.001

Education

-.17

<.001

Age

-.09

<.001

N = 5492
Adjusted r squared = .13

P-Value
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